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growth. In an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, we find a significant negative relationship
between the number of interest groups in a country and the volatility of GDP growth.
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The growth rate of GDP is lower in countries where growth varies more widely than
it is in countries where growth is more stable (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Loayza and
Hnatkovska, 2004; Mobarak, 2005). Growth stability is therefore an important objective
with respect to development. A number of studies have explored the determinants of
volatility in growth rates. Rodrik (1999) and Mobarak (2005) emphasize the role of po-
litical institutions.1 Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001), and Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen
(2002), and Agion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2005) highlight the importance of
the ¯nancial sector. In this brief paper, we assess whether special-interest group activity
plays a role in stability.
Special-interest groups have been empirically linked to numerous political and economic
outcomes - the voting behavior of politicians and election results (Stratmann, 1992, 1998,
2002; Coates, 1996), product prices (Ellison and Wolfram, 2001), market capitalization
and stock returns (Roberts, 1990; Jayachandran, 2006; Coates and Wilson, 2007), ¯nancial
sector policy (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 2003), and investment and
growth (Heckelman, 2000; Coates and Heckelman, 2003a and 2003b; Coates, Heckelman,
and Wilson, 2007b). In addition, special-interest group activity has been empirically linked
to pro¯t stream and stock return volatility (Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1994; Coates
and Wilson, 2007). Our ¯ndings indicate that special-interest group activity is also a
determinant of the volatility of GDP growth. Using a panel data set on 108 countries, we
¯nd that interest groups are signi¯cantly and negatively associated with several measures
of growth volatility.
2. Measurement of Interest Group Activity and Volatility
In this section we brie°y describe the data used in the analysis. The dataset consists of
250 observations, on an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, over three decades, 1973-1982,
1985-1994, and 1995-2004. All country-years for which the requisite data are available are
included in the analysis.
We measure interest group activity with a count of the number of interest groups in a
country. The counts are assembled using the 1973, 1985, and 1995 editions of the World
Guide to Trade Associations. Counts from the Guide have also been used by Heckelman
(2000), Coates and Heckelman (2003b), and Coates and Wilson (2007) in studies of growth
determinants, and by Murrell (1984), Kennelly and Murrell (1991), Bischo® (2003), and
Coates, Heckelman, and Wilson (2007a) in studies of interest group formation. The Guide
is an international directory of \trade associations," covering more than 170 countries, and
nearly 400 categories of groups. The 1985 edition includes over 30,000 listings, strati¯ed
by country and by sector. The Guide is quite comprehensive with respect to association
types, and includes groups in the industrial, commercial, trade, and service sectors, as well
as professional organizations, consumer organizations, employer and labor groups, and
organizations of service professionals.
1 Henisz (2004) examines the role of political institutions in policy volatility.
1Summary statistics for the group counts are listed in the top portion of Table 1. The
mean number of groups across countries is 252.50. There is substantial dispersion in the
group counts, with a standard deviation more than 2.5 times the mean. Albania, Guinea-
Bissau, Mongolia, and Yemen have the fewest groups in the sample, with 1; and the U.S.
has the most groups, with 5619.
Following Mobarak (2005), we examine several measures of the volatility of real per
capita GDP growth. In particular, we examine the standard deviation and interquar-
tile range of annual real per capita GDP growth (henceforth, Standard Deviation and
Interquartile Range). We also examine each of these measures interacted with a dummy
variable that captures a sign change in growth rates during the relevant decade (henceforth,
Sign), and with the fraction of years in which a sign change occurred during the relevant
decade (henceforth, Freq.). These measures are computed over the periods 1973-1982 (cor-
responding to the 1973 group counts), 1985-1994 (corresponding to the 1985 group counts),
and 1995-2004 (corresponding to the 1995 group counts). Summary statistics for each of
the volatility measures are listed in Table 1.
Simple correlations are reported in Table 2. As the ¯rst column indicates, Interest
Groups is negatively and signi¯cantly related to all of the volatility measures examined.
The correlation between Standard Deviation and Interest Groups is slightly stronger than
between Interquartile Range and Interest Groups. Each of the volatility measures is highly
positively correlated with the others.
3. Model and Methods
To more thoroughly assess the relationship between interest group activity and volatil-
ity, we estimate the following regression
V olatilityi;t = ® + ¯ SIGi;t +° ° °Xi;t +± ± ± D + "i;t ;
where V olatility is a measure of volatility; SIG is the natural logarithm of the number of
special interest groups; X is a vector of control variables; D is a vector of time dummies;
® and ¯ are parameters to be estimated, and ° ° ° and ± ± ± are vectors of parameters to be
estimated; " is a random error term; i indexes countries; and t indexes the three time
periods. The variables included in the vector X are those that Mobarak (2005) identi¯es
as signi¯cantly related to volatility. In addition, we include a measure of ¯nancial sector
development, Private Credit. Variable descriptions and data sources are included in the
appendix.
To account for heteroskedasticity, inference is based on the bias-adjusted HC3 variance-
covariance matrix estimator, favored by Chesher and Jewitt (1987) and Cribari-Neto,
Ferrari, and Oliveira (2005). To account for bias due to endogeneity of certain right-
hand-side control variables, we estimate the model using instrumental variables. We treat
the variables In°ation, Trade, Private Credit, and Political Rights as endogenous. Mobarak
(2005) uses a dummy variable for Muslim countries as an instrument for Political Rights.
However, we ¯nd that the Hansen test rejects the null of valid instruments in a number of
2speci¯cations when a Muslim dummy is used as an excluded instrument. We therefore use
initial values of In°ation, Trade, Private Credit, and Political Rights, along with Latitude,
and a dummy for OECD membership status in 1985 as excluded instruments.
4. Regression Results
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 3a. As the ¯rst row of the
table indicates, Interest Groups is negatively and signi¯cantly related to volatility in all
cases. The magnitude of the e®ect is smallest in columns (3) and (6), when the volatility
measures are interacted with the fraction of years in which a sign change in growth occurred
(Freq.). The magnitude of the coe±cient on Interest Groups in column (1) indicates that
a one percent increase in the number of interest groups reduces the standard deviation of
the growth rate by 0.494. This ¯nding represents a 13.8% drop relative to the average of
Standard Deviation. A one percent increase in groups has a slightly weaker impact relative
to the mean of the Interquartile Range, reducing volatility 11.5% based on the coe±cient
estimate of -0.547 in column (4). These ¯ndings indicate that interest group activity has
a stabilizing e®ect on GDP growth. Moreover, the magnitude of the e®ect is economically
meaningful.
Consistent with the ¯ndings of Mobarak (2005), the results in Table 3a also indicate
that Political Rights is signi¯cantly related to volatility. The political rights index takes
high values in countries with low levels of political rights. The positive coe±cient thus
indicates that democracy is associated with stability in GDP growth. Sectoral Diversi¯ca-
tion and Services Share are also signi¯cantly related to volatility. The positive coe±cient
on Sectoral Diversi¯cation indicates that less diversi¯ed economies are more volatile, as
would be expected.2
The group counts from the 1973 edition of the Guide are not strictly comparable to the
counts from the 1985 and 1995 editions, due to changes in the inclusion criterion used by
the editors. The time dummies included in the model should capture systematic di®erences
in the counts across time.3 However, as a robustness check on the ¯ndings in Table 3a,
we have also analyzed a subsample of the data that includes only the 1985-1994 and 1995-
2004 decades. Elimination of the 1973-1982 decade from the sample also allows us to
examine the relationship between volatility and political risk, using data from The PRS
Group's International Country Risk Guide, which is available starting in 1984. Findings
are reported in Table 3b.
As the ¯rst row of the table indicates, Interest Groups is negatively and signi¯cantly
related to volatility in ¯ve of the six cases examined. The magnitude of the coe±cients
in columns (1)-(3) are similar to those in Table 3a. The magnitude of the coe±cients in
2 As Mobarak (2005) notes, developed economies with large service sectors can appear undiversi¯ed based on the measure Sectoral
Diversi¯cation. Services Share is included in the model to control for this possibility.
3 The estimated coe±cient on the 1973 year dummy is highly signi¯cant. We note that the variable may be picking up the
di®erences between the 1973 and the other counts. However, the variable may also be capturing the impact of macroeconomic
shocks experienced during the 1973-1982 decade.
3columns (4)-(6) are smaller than those in Table 3a. Nonetheless, the estimates indicate
that the impact of Interest Groups on stability is still economically meaningful.
We explored several measures of political risk, including government stability, internal
con°ict, external con°ict, corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality. Consistent
with Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001), none of these variables was found to be signif-
icantly related to volatility (in unreported regressions). As Table 3b indicates however,
the variable Investment Pro¯le, which captures contract viability/expropriation, pro¯ts
repatriation, and payment delays, is signi¯cantly related to several measures of volatility.
The coe±cients indicate that lower investment risk is, not surprisingly, associated with
less volatility.
Table 3b also indicates that Political Rights is not associated with volatility in the
smaller sample. A natural suspicion is that the inclusion of Investment Pro¯le in the
model wipes out the relationship between democracy and volatility identi¯ed in Table 3a.
However, when Investment Pro¯le is excluded from the speci¯cations, the estimated coef-
¯cients on Political Rights remain insigni¯cant. The coe±cients of variation in Political
Rights are virtually identical in the full sample and the subsample, and we have not been
able to identify any explanation for the inconsistent ¯ndings. We do note that Easterly,
Islam, and Stiglitz (2001) examine the role of institutional development in volatility, in-
cluding a measure of democracy, and do not ¯nd such variables are signi¯cantly related to
volatility.
5. Concluding Remarks
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001) write, \We need to ask whether this high volatility
[in GDP growth] can be explained simply by the fact that the countries are exposed to
more shocks (or have a less diversi¯ed economy) than others or whether it is explained by
other aspects of their structure or policy regimes." The ¯ndings presented here take a step
toward answering this question, by investigating the relationship between interest groups
and volatility of GDP growth. We ¯nd that interest groups are signi¯cantly and negatively
related to volatility. Interest groups thus appear to be an institutional structure linked to
stability.
Stigler (1971) and Olson (1982) suggest that interest groups seek to protect incum-
bent ¯rms and/or workers, and block innovation. Olson (1982) also argues that groups
impede e±cient resource reallocation in response to shocks. In future work we will attempt
to identify whether these hypotheses underlie the negative relationship between interest
groups and volatility revealed here. Future work should also more thoroughly explore the
extent to which links between democracy and volatility can be attributed to the role of
interest groups in open and free societies. Further analysis of the impact of groups on
¯nancial sector policy may also yield useful insights into volatility.
In addition, the ¯ndings presented here should stimulate theoretical work. A number of
formal theoretical models link interest groups and growth, including Parente and Prescott
(1994, 1999), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Herrendorf and Teixeria (2004), and Parente
and Zhao (2006). However, to our knowledge, no formal theoretical work links groups
4and growth volatility. The ¯ndings here suggest that such work could provide a promising
opportunity for structural empirical studies. In addition, Grier, Munger, and Roberts
(1994) ¯nd that interest group activity is negatively associated with variability in the
pro¯t streams of U.S. industries. Their ¯ndings suggest that models in which risk averse
¯rms lobby for policies that reduce the variability of their pro¯t streams may be of interest.
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7Appendix
Variable De¯nitions and Data Sources
The dataset consists of 250 observations, on an unbalanced panel of 108 countries, over
three decades, 1973-1982, 1985-1994, and 1995-2004. Volatility measures and averages of
control variables cover the periods 1973-1982, 1985-1994 and 1995-2004. Initial values are
for the years 1973, 1985 and 1995.
Dependent Variables
Standard Deviation: The standard deviation of annual real per capita GDP. Source:
World Bank World Development Indicators.
Standard Deviation/Sign: Standard Deviation interacted with a dummy variable indi-
cating an annual growth rate sign change during the relevant decade. Source: World
Bank World Development Indicators.
Standard Deviation/Freq.: Standard Deviation interacted with the fraction of years in
which an annual growth rate sign change occurred during the relevant decade. Source:
World Bank World Development Indicators.
Interquartile Range: The interquartile range of annual real per capita GDP. Source:
World Bank World Development Indicators.
Interquartile Range/Sign: Interquartile Range interacted with a dummy variable indi-
cating an annual growth rate sign change during the relevant decade. Source: World
Bank World Development Indicators.
Interquartile Range/Freq.: Interquartile Range interacted with the fraction of years in
which an annual growth rate sign change occurred during the relevant decade. Source:
World Bank World Development Indicators.
Independent Variable of Primary Interest
Interest Groups (initial value): Log of the number of interest groups in a country.
Source: Third and fourth editions of the World Guide to Trade Associations.
Control Variables
Initial GDP (initial value): Log of real GDP per capita in USD. Source: World Bank
World Development Indicators.
In°ation (average and initial value): Annual percent change in the CPI. Source: World
Bank World Development Indicators.
Trade (average and initial value): Annual share of trade in GDP. Source: World Bank
World Development Indicators.
Private Credit (average and initial value): Annual share of domestic credit provided by
banking sector in GDP. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Political Rights (average and initial value): An index of the degree of freedom in the
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government,
using an inverse of the original 1 - 7 scale such that higher values now represent more
political rights. Source: Freedom House, \Freedom in the World 2006: The Annual
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties."
8Investment Pro¯le (average and initial value): An index of investment risk, with values
from 0 (very high risk) to 12 (very low risk); index components are Contract Viabil-
ity/Expropriation, Pro¯ts Repatriation, and Payment Delays. Source: The Political
Risk Services' International Country Risk Guide.
Population (initial value): Log of the total population. Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators.
1973 Year Dummy: A dummy variable indicating the 1973-1982 subsample.
1985 Year Dummy: A dummy variable indicating the 1985-1994 subsample.
Excluded Instruments (with the exception of initial values noted above)
Latitude: Latitude in degrees. Source: Global Development Network.
OECD Dummy: Dummy variable indicating OECD membership prior to 1985. Source:
OECD.
9TABLE 1 - Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Observations
Deviation
Total Groups 252.50 682.99 1.00 5619.00 250
Log of Groups 3.75 1.80 0.00 8.63 250
Standard Deviation
| 3.55 2.59 0.37 19.35 250
Sign 3.12 2.75 0.00 19.35 250
Freq. 1.08 1.18 0.00 7.74 250
Interquartile Range
| 4.74 3.83 0.52 29.80 250
Sign 4.09 3.87 0.00 24.24 250
Freq. 1.47 1.74 0.00 9.45 250
Notes: Total Groups is the number of interest groups. Log of Groups is the log of the number of interest groups.
Standard Deviation is the standard deviation of annual real GDP per capita growth over the relevant decade. In-
terquartile Range is the interquartile range of annual real GDP per capita growth over the relevant decade. Both
Standard Deviation and Interquartile Range are interacted with a dummy variable indicating an annual growth rate
sign change during the relevant decade (Sign) and with the fraction of years in which a sign change occurred during
the relevant decade (Freq.)
TABLE 2 - Correlations
Interest Standard Deviation Interquartile Range
Groups
| Sign Freq. | Sign Freq.
Standard Deviation
| -0.395
with Sign -0.326 0.871
with Freq. -0.316 0.796 0.895
Interquartile Range
| -0.312 0.863 0.696 0.708
with Sign -0.273 0.756 0.879 0.855 0.830
with Freq. -0.263 0.687 0.781 0.928 0.779 0.914 1.00
Notes: All correlations are signi¯cant at better than the 1% level. Interest Groups is the log of the number of interest
groups. Standard Deviation is the standard deviation of annual real GDP per capita growth over the relevant decade.
Interquartile Range is the interquartile range of annual real GDP per capita growth over the relevant decade. Both
Standard Deviation and Interquartile Range are interacted with a dummy variable indicating an annual growth rate
sign change during the relevant decade (Sign) and with the fraction of years in which a sign change occurred during the
relevant decade (Freq.)
10TABLE 3a - Volatility and Interest Groups (1973, 1985, 1995)
Standard Deviation Interquartile Range
Interactions { Sign Freq. { Sign Freq.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest -0.489 -0.415 -0.171 -0.547 -0.489 -0.223
Groups (0.000) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.026) (0.020)
Control Variables
Initial GDP 0.083 0.126 0.046 0.104 0.216 0.059
(0.682) (0.589) (0.636) (0.711) (0.500) (0.698)
In°ation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.698) (0.854) (0.680) (0.303) (0.526) (0.472)
Trade -0.008 -0.017 -0.006 -0.005 -0.019 -0.007
(0.176) (0.024) (0.034) (0.527) (0.066) (0.093)
Private -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.014 -0.004
Credit (0.954) (0.577) (0.773) (0.559) (0.200) (0.372)
Political 0.274 0.348 0.170 0.416 0.522 0.226
Rights (0.035) (0.030) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015)
Diversi¯ed 0.092 0.204 0.125 -0.643 -0.558 -0.057
Exporter (0.774) (0.586) (0.346) (0.157) (0.283) (0.773)
Sectoral 19.055 18.462 8.572 27.276 25.588 12.122
Diversi¯cation (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Services -9.923 -8.129 -3.611 -12.345 -8.865 -4.319
Share (0.002) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.027) (0.018)
Population -0.194 -0.285 -0.132 -0.056 -0.144 -0.091
(0.289) (0.156) (0.076) (0.851) (0.615) (0.394)
Constant 3.901 3.989 1.203 -0.514 -0.761 -0.301
(0.378) (0.330) (0.435) (0.943) (0.897) (0.898)
1973 1.654 1.647 0.846 3.619 3.627 1.693
Year Dummy (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1985 0.940 0.688 0.248 1.707 1.345 0.472
Year Dummy (0.023) (0.121) (0.162) (0.012) (0.032) (0.065)
R2 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.38
Hansen(df) 4.69(2) 4.95(2) 2.30(2) 2.93(2) 5.19(2) 3.15(2)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250
Notes: Dependent variables are the standard deviation of annual per capita GDP growth (Standard Deviation),
alone as well as interacted with a dummy variable indicating an annual growth rate sign change during the relevant
decade (Sign) and interactied with the fraction of years in which a sign change occurred during the relevant decade
(Freq.); and the interquartile range of growth (Interquartile Range), alone and interacted with Sign and Freq. p-
values are in parentheses. Generalized R2 reported. The null of the Hansen test is that the instruments are not
correlated with the residuals. The 10% and 5% critical values of the Hansen test are 4.61 and 5.99, respectively.
Excluded instruments include: OECD Dummy, Latitude, initial In°ation, initial Trade, initial Private Credit,
initial Political Rights.
11TABLE 3b - Volatility and Interest Groups (1985, 1995)
Standard Deviation Interquartile Range
Interactions { Sign Freq. { Sign Freq.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest -0.494 -0.416 -0.135 -0.394 -0.342 -0.122
Groups (0.000) (0.015) (0.035) (0.021) (0.060) (0.140)
Control Variables
Initial GDP 0.145 0.036 0.032 0.246 0.137 0.063
(0.559) (0.902) (0.777) (0.411) (0.673) (0.669)
In°ation 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.236) (0.132) (0.734) (0.148) (0.073) (0.611)
Trade -0.004 -0.014 -0.004 0.004 -0.011 -0.003
(0.541) (0.131) (0.215) (0.712) (0.278) (0.421)
Private 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001
Credit (0.434) (0.714) (0.403) (0.835) (0.708) (0.804)
Political -0.092 -0.055 -0.023 -0.264 -0.201 -0.095
Rights (0.544) (0.750) (0.746) (0.277) (0.355) (0.358)
Investment -0.605 -0.480 -0.309 -1.167 -0.967 -0.518
Pro¯le (0.121) (0.239) (0.069) (0.107) (0.074) (0.025)
Diversi¯ed 0.326 0.496 0.147 -0.218 -0.039 0.023
Exporter (0.352) (0.240) (0.271) (0.624) (0.936) (0.895)
Sectoral 13.463 11.558 3.911 16.430 12.441 4.126
Diversi¯cation (0.022) (0.142) (0.159) (0.029) (0.242) (0.317)
Services -7.444 -4.843 -1.483 -8.890 -3.884 -1.195
Share (0.028) (0.249) (0.302) (0.039) (0.426) (0.528)
Population -0.175 -0.295 -0.131 -0.058 -0.187 -0.099
(0.285) (0.143) (0.047) (0.805) (0.446) (0.227)
Constant 9.229 10.390 4.748 10.798 11.543 5.736
(0.039) (0.029) (0.011) (0.180) (0.034) (0.015)
1985 -0.236 -0.277 -0.366 -0.678 -0.726 -0.610
Year Dummy (0.689) (0.690) (0.211) (0.448) (0.373) (0.085)
R2 0.30 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.20
Hansen(df) 2.79(2) 3.60(2) 3.08(2) 0.25(2) 2.69(2) 2.37(2)
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185
Notes: Dependent variables are the standard deviation of annual per capita GDP growth (Standard Deviation),
alone as well as interacted with a dummy variable indicating an annual growth rate sign change during the relevant
decade (Sign) and interactied with the fraction of years in which a sign change occurred during the relevant decade
(Freq.); and the interquartile range of growth (Interquartile Range), alone and interacted with Sign and Freq. p-
values are in parentheses. Generalized R2 reported. The null of the Hansen test is that the instruments are not
correlated with the residuals. The 10% and 5% critical values of the Hansen test are 4.61 and 5.99, respectively.
Excluded instruments include: OECD Dummy, Latitude, initial Trade, initial Private Credit, initial Political
Rights, initial Investment Pro¯le.
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